Elite Circulation Case Study of the Jordanian Parliament

Khalid Issa Aledwan, Mohammed T. Bani Salameh, Emad Shdouh *

ABSTRACT

This study aimed to identify the range of the parliamentary elite circulation in the Jordanian House of Representatives versus the profession and job characteristics of these elites. In addition, as a part of this study, a comparison between the reign of King Hussein and that of King Abdullah II was conducted, in order to assess their impact on the circulation rate. The goal was to test the study hypothesis that postulated the existence of a positive relationship between the reform transitions that took place in the State, and its impact on the creation of a real structural shifts of parliamentary elites in terms of circulation and the change in their profession and job characteristics. To achieve the purpose of this study, the comparative method, along with the political elite approach, was adopted. The study yielded a number of findings, the most important of which was that the holding of public jobs and positions is the most important component of the parliamentary elite structure. Additionally, the study refuted the hypothesis that it aimed to address, since achieving some reform transitions did not result in bringing about a significant shift in the parliamentary elite structure from the profession and job perspective.

Keywords: Parliamentary Elite Circulation, Profession and Job Characteristics.

Introduction

Democracy is not simply a form of the ruling regime, but is also a search into the nature of the state or a way of making decisions that require a degree of responsiveness to the public wishes (Hilal, 1987: 35). The distinguishing feature of democracy as a form of the ruling is that it provides freedom in the formation and emergence of elites and the organized competition between them over the power centers. Under the democratic regimes, elite is relatively open as it arises on the basis of competence and merit (worthiness). In addition, the public would be able to participate in ruling through the exercise of choosing among the various rival elites, who constantly work formally and publicly in curbing the power the other enjoys. This is the process by which democracy is protected and maintained, as well as the social equilibrium achieved (Honderich, 1986: 133-138).

A democratic transition will either occur by an initiative from the political regime, or as a form of “transition by replacement” with the participation of the ruling and the opposition elites. In the former pattern, the likely outcome will be the establishment of a restricted democracy with the continuation of the same elites in control of the political regime. Thus, a democratic transition would either be limited, or the ruling elite will strategize in order to remain in power, with the ability of the opposition to take advantage of the limited political openness to strive toward change.

In the pattern of democratic transition by replacement, however, the transition will be based on negotiation and compromise between the ruling and opposition elites. In such case, the opposition moves toward exploiting openness, while being unable to bring about all the desired changes; hence, they resort to political compromises and arrangements to ensure stability of the regime. The opposition is therefore guiding the ruling regime to the path toward democracy while protecting the interests of the elites of both parties.

In this case, establishing democracy will depend on the balance of power and the nature of the deals being negotiated. For instance, the autocratic elite may pull out from the ruling regime in exchange for political amnesty and some privileges that do not make them pose any obstacle to the new power. Additionally, there will be an association between the democracy and the credibility of the new elites and their ability to mobilize the masses. Time is also an important factor in getting accustomed to the rules.

* Political Science Department, Yarmouk University; and Director of No Restrictions Center for the Political Research & Studies, Jordan. Received on 13/7/2016 and Accepted for Publication on 8/11/2016.
of democracy and the establishment of an appropriate political culture in the society (Elah, 1997:22-24).

One of the most important conditions for democratic transition is a creation of a new political culture among both the ruling elite and the opposition elite, giving rise to the development of a new political awareness conducive to reworking the legal sources and establishing democratic institutions. This requires a political deal between the authority and the opposition in order to achieve political stability and respond to the public demands (Speech from the Throne, 1990).

The early democratic transition in Jordan in 1989—represented by holding parliamentary elections after being frozen for over 20 years—was "a forced royal choice" to face the existing economic and social challenges. Its further aim was to counteract the threats against the Jordanian society and participation of the ruling and the opposition elites in the democratic transition. The goal of the reform in all political, economic, and social sects (Speech from the Throne, 1987) was expected to result in a comprehensive consensual formula derived from the provisions of the Constitution and the principles on which the Kingdom stands (Speech from the Throne, 1990).

The National Charter represented the inactivation of the autocratic rulers (the period of martial law), and substituting it by other rules that were reached by negotiation held among a group of political actors (National Charter), in a society that was "in a status of socioeconomic tension" (King Hussein's speech at the Royal Commission for the formulation of the National Charter, 1990). The Charter also included the main pillars of a political and social stability, namely the state of law and the rule of law, political pluralism, multiparty, and ideological pluralism, and their regulating rules and controls, meeting the social justice requirements, the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship constants, as well as the Jordan-Arab, Jordan-Islamic and international relationships, etc.

In light of the foregoing, 1989 was the turning point on the path toward the long journey of democratic transition in Jordan. In spite of the sluggish and cumbersome movement towards democracy, 2011 had witnessed a number of stages that influenced the path of political reform, which coincided with the "Arab Spring". A National Dialogue Committee was formed, followed by the formation of a Constitution Amendment Committee. The most important outcome was the amendment of 42 constitutional articles comprising more than one-third of the Jordanian Constitution, which had actually been among the most important recommendations of the National Dialogue Committee (Bani Salama & Ananzah, 2015). They have further strengthened the Parliament's powers, which has led to the establishment of the Constitutional Court in 2012, the foundation of the Independent Electoral Commission in 2012, and the Law of the Independence of the Judiciary, which entitled only the Supreme Judicial Council to regulate all matters relating to judges, in addition to the issuance of the new Parties Law for 2015 and the Law of Decentralization of 2015.

These steps toward reform have motivated the present study, aiming to explore and explain the reform complexities. The elite circulation is in genuine need of a renewal of political life and improving processes within the political regime. It does not make sense that the same political elites who prevailed in the "pre-democratic" phase would also lead the "transition towards democracy". Therefore, it is likely that the shift in the elite structure would take place, whereby the parliamentary elite would be an influential leap in the democratic transition. Indeed, renewal of the parliamentary elites is important to the improvement of the entire political system. Hence, it is necessary to seek the renewal of elites in the context of the democratic developments, and try to elucidate the extent of changes that took place in the parliamentary elite structure in relation to the reform calls periodically announced by the State of Jordan, as this signifies the importance of the parliamentary institution as a representative institution from a democratic perspective.

Significance of the Study

The significance of this study stems from the scarcity - or absence-of pertinent literature (to the best of the authors’ knowledge) in which the subject matter of this study has been discussed, thus making this work one of the pioneering studies in this field. The aim of the study - which remained unexplored thus far - is to introduce a new approach to the examination of the parliamentary elite circulation rate in Jordan. To date, no analytical political study on the political parliamentary elite circulation rate has been conducted, and analyses of their profession and job characteristics, their political roles and how they interplay are lacking. This work will address this shortcoming by employing the comparative method
between two reigns during the monarchy, in Jordan's case.

The above mentioned enhances the scientific significance of the study since it addresses the political elite from the perspective of the elites' circulation and its effect on the political regimes. On the practical level, it is an applied study that may open the door to other studies, possibly on the correlation between the elite circulation and the reality of political life. It is likely that the study findings and recommendations will help in the exploration of the truth about the reality of the elites in Jordan against the journey to democracy.

Study Objectives

The overall objective of the study is the attempt to provide an analysis of the parliamentary elite circulation in Jordan through:

1. Identifying the profession and job characteristics of the Jordanian parliamentary elite, and how those characteristics affect the parliamentary elite circulation.
2. Identifying the Jordanian parliamentary elite circulation during the reigns of King Hussein bin Talal and King Abdullah II.
3. Comparing the profession and job characteristics of Jordanian parliamentary elites and their circulation rate during the reign of King Hussein bin Talal and that of King Abdullah II.

The Study Problem

The authors of this work recognized an essential and urgent need to have a clear understanding of the problem of this study. It is based on the assumption of the existence of a correlation—that might vary in magnitude and direction—between the democratic developments Jordan is trying to achieve, the issue of the official political elite that could be affected by the movement toward democracy, and the status of the transition taking place in Jordan regardless of the limits of this correlation—from the elite circulation perspective. The politically appropriate assumption is that the official political elite structure is affected by the ongoing reform programs, and that the traditional elites and their system that steered the State during the "pre-democratic transformation" stage should not remain in charge and should not be responsible for steering the "democratic transition" process. This furthers the need to research the reality of the elites in Jordan—the parliamentary structure, due to its significance for democracy and the amount of change that occurred in its characteristics and structural framework along the course of political life and its transformations. This dilemma has led to the escalation of demands by the opposition as well as the national forces toward achieving a higher rate of elite circulation. The long-standing stasis must also be broken, as an indication of the seriousness of both political reforms and economic reforms. In that sense, the study aimed to answer the following question: Is there a relationship between some democratic reforms in Jordan and the parliamentary elite circulation rate? Or did the parliamentary elites “calcify” in a sense that there had been no real circulation and those in power hold the same profession and job characteristics?.

The Study Questions

The study sought to find answers to the following questions:

1. What are the profession and job characteristics of the Jordanian parliamentary elite, and how those characteristics affect the parliamentary elite circulation?
2. What are the Jordanian parliamentary elite circulation rates in the reigns of King Hussein bin Talal and King Abdullah II?
3. What are the similarities and differences in the profession and job characteristics of Jordanian parliamentary elites and their circulation rate during the reign of King Hussein bin Talal and that of King Abdullah II?

The Study Hypothesis

The study hypothesis can be stated as follows: The profession and job characteristics of parliamentary elites and their circulation rate are positively related to the democratic transition and political reform prevailing in the State, whereby the increased rate of the parliamentary elite circulation and altered profession and job characteristic are positively related to the attempt to pursue democratic transition and political reform.

The Study Methodology

The study followed the methodologies described below.

(1) The Political Elite Methodology:

This methodology is based on the assumption of the existence of two categories in any society; one is of small number, but it accounts for the lion's share of power and authority, while the other is more numerous, but enjoys a
smaller share of power and authority. The elite can be identified by different criteria, including positions, decision-making power, and fame. This approach was chosen because it helps to identify the elites in the parliament. The focus of this study was on the “official” position, since the approach implies that people who occupy key positions in the political institutions are actually the State’s powerful and influential figures (Al-Barghouthi, 2009:25). The power of the “position tool” is derived from the fact that the elite would attain their official position through the posts they occupy, rather than their personal characteristics or job qualifications. The shortcoming of this approach is that it is limited to the statistical narrative of personal information (profession, job, family and political affiliation, among others) (Ansar, 1992:203). In the present study, however, it is posited that the power and influence does not exclusively derive from positions, but can also derive from outside the scope of official institutions, as there does exist an unofficial elite alongside the official elite. Nevertheless, for the purpose of scientific rigor of the study, the official elites will be the focus of the analyses conducted, which is methodologically more appropriate approach, as it avoid the difficulties in identifying the unofficial elite. This approach is also necessitated by the unavailability of scientifically accurate control tools aside from knowledge of some of the elite features, such as the profession and job characteristics.

(2) The Comparative Method:

Use of the comparative method is premised on the existence of partial similarity or partial dissimilarity. Comparison between completely different or identical phenomena is pointless. The comparison will be conducted with respect to two units, namely the parliamentary elites in terms of profession and job characteristics of the Members of Parliament (MPs), and the elite circulation rate in the reigns of King Hussein bin Talal and King Abdullah II. This will enable identifying the similarities and differences of parliamentary elites during these two reigns.

The Study Concepts

Parliamentary Elite:

An Elite is a “descriptive term of individuals and groups in certain hierarchical summit” (Evans & Newnham, n.d.). The general features of an elite that makes general policy include average age; the level of knowledge, expertise, specialization; the proportion of civilian and military, etc. (Yousuf, 1985:202). The conditions leading to the production of elite vary from one society to another and from one country to another, with the economic and social development being important factors. The developing countries represent a vivid study subject of the social forces contributing to the creation of new elite (Bottomore, 1988:120).

Parliamentary elite is a general concept and refers to a small number of MPs that, according to certain indicators, account for the lion’s share of power and authority within the parliament compared to the remaining members that comprise the majority. The authors of the present study use the term “Parliamentary Elite” to refer to the members of the Jordanian Parliament as a whole, as they represent an official elite from the standpoint of an elected chamber as part of the legislative authority, which is in turn one of the political regime’s pillars. The study aim is neither searching for members of parliament who monopolize power and authority within, nor identifying members who constitute parliamentary elite. Precisely, the intent is to study the parliamentary elite—MPs—as a whole over a number of years and compare the circulation rate and the extent of change in their profession and job characteristics.

The Parliamentary Elite Circulation:

This concept refers to the process whereby some degree of parliamentary elite mobility is brought about intrinsically or extrinsically, indicating whether there is structural stasis or alteration toward new parliamentary elites, not only at the individual level, but also in the formational characteristics as well.

The concept of elite circulation can be addressed through the procedural indicators discussed below.

(1) At Individual Level:

1. The degree of change and transformation in the parliamentary elites in terms of replacing former MPs by new ones, which means that the old elite does not persist either fully or partially. It is only then that one can state that there is a real parliamentary elite circulation at a specific rate.

2. The degree of parliamentary stasis means that the parliamentary elite remains in the parliament over time, therefore posing resistance against receiving new parliamentary elites, whether completely or partially. At this point, it will be obvious that the elite circulation has been confined to the old elite, who controls its persistence
in the parliament and uses various mechanisms to maintain its survival and overcome any attempts of bypassing or replacing them. It indicates that the elite mobility external to this elite failed to substitute it, and therefore the mobility stayed internal.

(2) From the Characteristic Standpoint:
In this context, characteristics pertain to the profession and job characteristics of the MPs and their comparison between several parliaments, in terms of:
1. Comparing the extent to which the parliamentary elite retained their profession and job characteristics along several parliaments.
2. Comparing the extent of change in the profession and job characteristics of parliamentary elite along several parliaments.

Parliamentary Elite Circulation Rate:
In the present study, the elite circulation rate was calculated using the following equation: Elites Circulation rate = Number of new MPs ÷ number of former MPs measured by a unit of "one time"; meaning the number of times. The lower the elite circulation rate is, the more it indicates stasis and calcification of the old elites, while a high circulation rate demonstrates renewal and change in the structure of elite.

Note that—for the sake of further verification of the elite parliamentary circulation rate compared to the profession and job change a number of tables on the elite circulation were employed, with the new deputies who had been ministers or served in public positions, and has worked out the circulation rate of new deputies who had held public positions. The purpose was to portray a more comprehensive picture of the reality of change in the parliamentary elites associated with new MPs of public and ministerial profession, background, so as to explore the depth and reality of elite circulation against the extent of change in the features of job description and professional background. The reason is that there may be new MPs, but sharing the same job and professional background, which makes the elite circulation rate alone - without relating it to the circulation rate of new MPs who held public positions - incomplete and distorted. Their percentage was calculated through the following equation: The total number of new MPs who occupied governmental and public positions ÷ the number of remaining of the total number of MPs. Note that, in the study, the term “elite circulation rate” was used interchangeably with the term “elite replacement rate”.

The Study Limits
The study was affected by the following limitations:
1. Place limits: The Parliament of Jordan
2. Time limits: The period between 1989 (which marked the beginning of democratic transition in Jordan) and 2013 that witnessed the elections of the 17th Parliament (2013-2016, which was dissolved in May 29, 2016). In other words, the study pertains to all parliaments since the return of parliamentary life in Jordan in 1989 until the election of the 17th Parliament in 2013.
3. Substantive limits: The political elites and their rate of circulation as represented by Jordanian MPs.

The Study Structure
Based on the foregoing and in the context of addressing the research problem, answering the study question, and testing its hypothesis, the content of this work divided into preface, introduction to the study, which provides background on the elite circulation, and several thematic sections. The first section includes the position of the legislative authority within the Jordanian political regime, the second deals with the electoral laws, the third section deals with the profession and job characteristics of the Jordanian MPs and the their circulation rate during the reign of King Hussein bin Talal, and the fourth pertains to the profession and job characteristics of the Jordanian MPs and the their circulation rate during the reign of King Abdullah II. The fifth section is titled The Parliamentary Elites: A Comparison between the reigns of King Hussein and King Abdullah II. Finally, the paper concludes by presenting the most important findings of the study.

Elite Circulation: Introduction to the study
The conditions leading to the production of elite vary from one society to another and from one country to another, with the economic and social development being important factors. The developing countries represent a vivid study subject of the social forces contributing to the creation of new elite (Bottomore, 1988:25).

The pioneers of the Elite Theory attempted to explain how the elite circulation takes place in the political regime. Pareto defined the "Elite Circulation" as being a mechanism adopted by the elite to maintain sustainment and continuity. That process takes place through two
cycles (Bottomore, 1988:120).

The first cycle pertains to the "internal circulation", which is demonstrated by the elite’s ability to absorb ideas and people from outside and bring them into the elite circle in order to preserve its unity and prevent the formation of a counter elite.

The second cycle is marked by the "external circulation", which is the process experienced by a ruling elite when they cannot achieve their goals through the "internal circulation". In such cases, as the existing elite fails to absorb ideas and people from outside the elite, it will decline, leaving the space for a new elite to emerge, one that is capable of performing core functions in society.

Pareto explained Elite Circulation as the process whereby the ruling elite is being replaced by another elite or ascent of members from the lower strata to the governing elite. Elite Circulation is marked by the transformations that occur in the psychological characteristics of the elite members where they lose some residues which used to give them motivation and efficiency. The loss of these residues leads to the corruption of the elite. On the other hand, the residues of excellence and efficiency accumulate among members of the lower strata, which qualify them to gain power. Thus, the elite does not only change in numbers, but also in quality. In different stages, society will produce a different elite that reflects the prevailing interests in society.

Mills believes that elites mobilize within the circle of continuous cooperation and coordination within. As a part of this coordination, they establish coalitions, form caucuses and build unofficial social relationships, as in friendship, marriage, and so forth. The elite will then employ these forces for refining their entity and enhancing their strength (Abrash, 2012).

Miri-Cola Binska recognized three models of elite circulation (Bottomore, 1988:66):

1- Circulation occurring among the different groups of the governing elite itself, where it - peacefully or violently - exchanges the power and decision-making positions.

2- Circulation occurring between the governing elite and members of the various strata of society, who successfully make their way to join the existing elite.

3- Circulation occurring between the governing elite and members of the various strata in society, who will form new elites that will struggle against the existing elites for power.

The elite plurality theorists have long strived to harmonize democracy and the elite on one hand and to make a distinction between rulers and ruled on the other hand, by adopting the concept of competition between the various elites. Early in the twentieth century, a clear conception of democracy emerged, where the ruling of elite was evaluated by periodic elections. Some thinkers tried to establish an elitist theory of democracy, based on which the public cannot participate and express an opinion on the society’s and state’s complicated problems. This scenario necessitates a greater involvement by the elite and a greater reliance on the wisdom and thoughtfulness of its members.

Others thought that development in democratic life requires competition among elites, in addition to alteration in its social structure and its relations with the rest of the society. This means that democracy must involve a more rapid and comprehensive mobility of individuals within and outside the elite. Some are also of view that democracy denotes loss of homogeneity within the governing elite because it is burdened with the responsibility of decision making. Such decisions are now more complicated than those that had faced the old democratic societies (Bottomore, 1988:128-136).

Others have explained democracy as a political structure for elites who—through political parties—struggle over power by winning more votes in elections, in addition to lobbies attempting to influence the political decision making in favor of their interests (Aron, 1983:225-228).

Elite plays a major role in maintaining or losing its position. Failing to keep pace with the changes in society and responding to them accordingly is an early indicator that it is moving away from the elite framework and that it will be replaced by other emerging elites (Mohammad, 1989:370-371). Multiple factors are related to the elite’s ability to remain in the position of power. Those are (Ibrahim et al., 1996: 300):

1- Possessing distinctive individual characteristics with the ability to translate them into practice. Those characteristics must be constantly renewable.

2- Its ability to maintain control, influence, adapt to change, confront challenges and overcome the difficulties.

3- Its ability to speak for the interests of the majority of social groups and political, economic and union powers.
4- Ideologically neutral rather than being intolerant. This makes the elite trustworthy and respected by the various political powers and streams.

5- Its internal cohesion and socioeconomic homogeneity. Moreover, there is the individual as well as family communication within the elite.

6- Politically passive toward issues and events - a practice that portrays it as being neutral and accommodating toward different political powers and streams.

7- Its great loyalty to the president of the country and keenness to follow his policies, thus gaining his trust and satisfaction.

8- Bureaucratic and technocratic nature, which depicts its character as the protector of law, order and supreme interests of the state.

In the democratic regimes, changing the ruling elite is considered an essential and permanent political variable, because the structure of such regime has been shaped in a manner that is accommodating to different elites through peaceful mechanisms agreed upon by the various powers and elites, and by periodic elections.

Multiple peaceful tools are used by the ruling elite to stay in power and maintain control over the power sources, namely (Nawfal, 2000):

a) To adopt a certain ideology that fits the masses and mobilizes those masses for the interest of the ruling elite. In addition, to enact laws and regulations which legitimize its conduct.

b) To absorb the so-called troublemaking powers or elites, whether by materialistic temptation or by positions, and to impose legal restrictions in order to control the various opposition elite movements.

c) Adapting to the domestic, regional and international developments in a way that boosts its survival in the position for as long as possible.

d) To monopolize most of the production resources or place them under control of their close associates and loyalists. Moreover, to control the public money and monopolize the media, and impose legal controls that prevent their use by other powers and elites.

Elites can be classified in terms of change into open, closed, semi-open and semi-closed elite, depending on the number of times they held posts and their duration. An elite is closed or semi-closed if its rate of circulation or change is slow, or a person stays in the same position for long duration. Finally, elite is open or semi-open if members change frequently (Abu Esbaa, 1999:203-205).

Section I: The Position of Legislative Authority in the Jordanian Political Regime

The legislative authority formation has been influenced by the political, economic and social developments that had occurred in the Kingdom since it was founded in 1921 (Bani Salama & Ananzah, 2015:140-142). The first basic law was instituted in 1928 for Transjordan, pursuant to which the first legislative council of Transjordan Emirate was elected. The Emir used to form a council of elected members in two stages, in addition to members of the then Executive Board. The form and role of the Legislative Council subsequently evolved, due to the evolution of the State of Jordan into the legislative authority in Jordan in the current constitutional composition of the two Chambers—The Senate and the House of Representatives.

(1) The Senate:

Article (36) of the Jordanian Constitution of the year 1952 stated that “The King appoints the members of the Senate and appoints the Speaker of the Senate from amongst them and accepts their resignation.” Under the constitution, the number of senators must not exceed half of the number of MPs. The Senate Speaker’s term is two renewable years, without an upper limit. The King appoints the Senators upon a Royal Decree and under certain requirements that are stipulated in the Constitution. A Senator’s term of membership is four renewable years (Zraiqat, 2009:153). The Jordanian Constitution provided that the Senate shall meet simultaneously with the Chamber of Deputies and the sessions shall be the same for both Houses. If the Chamber of Deputies is dissolved, the sessions of the Senate shall be suspended.

Despite the fact that the Jordanian Constitution stated in the article (1) that “All Jordanians are equal in rights and duties”, the requirements of the Senate membership discriminate between Jordanians on the grounds of their professional background and class of origin. Membership requires the noble or wealthy aristocratic class, to say the least. The constitutional provisions also gave precedence to the King-appointed Senate Speaker over the elected Parliament Speaker in chairing the joint sessions of the National Assembly. This indeed upsets the existing constitutional principle of the parliamentary system of government with a hereditary monarchy.

(2) Parliament (House of Representatives):

The Chamber of Deputies shall consist of members
elected by secret ballot in a general direct election. The number of MPs is double the number of senators, in order to be able to prove the political superiority because of the outnumbering. This principle is in conformity with the democratic principles enjoyed by the follower political regimes (Khalil, 1971:185). The term of office of the Chamber of Deputies shall be four calendar years, commencing from the date of the announcement of the results of the general elections in the Official Gazette. The King may prolong the term of the Chamber for a period of not less than one year and not more than two years.6

The Jordanian Constitution gave the King the right to dissolve the parliament. The power of the King and government to dissolve it was restricted by the following conditions:

1. The members of the government during whose reign the parliament was dissolved must resign within one week from the date of dissolution. Its Prime Minister may not be assigned to form the following government.

2. Elections are to be held within no later than four months from the date of the dissolution decision. If elections were not held by the end of the four months, the dissolved parliament regains its full constitutional authority and reconvenes immediately as though it was not dissolved and continues its duties until a new parliament is elected.

The Constitution states that the King may by Royal Decree adjourn the session of the National Assembly for not more than three times, provided that during any one ordinary session the period of such postponement shall not exceed two months in the aggregate, including the period of postponement. When calculating the term of the session, the periods covered by any such adjournment shall not be included in the term. The King may, whenever necessary, summon the National Assembly to meet in an extraordinary session whenever indicated or at the request of an absolute majority of the deputies. The National Assembly shall not discuss in any extraordinary session, with the exception of matters specified in the Royal Decree convening the session.7

The parliament has three fundamental mandates, namely the legislative function, financial scrutiny and political oversight (Kiswani, 1985:269).

(1) Legislative Mandate:

The legislative process passes through a number of stages: drafting laws, discussing them, passing them to be submitted to the King for ratification and promulgation (Masalha, 2000:10). The National Assembly performs its legislative mandate by two main functions: proposal of bills and approving incoming bills from the executive authority, as the National Assembly’s power is limited to accepting, rejecting or amending bills. The Constitution also entitles the National Assembly to discuss agreements signed by the State with foreign countries or organizations, accepting or otherwise rejecting them, if such agreement will incur the State’s Treasury any monetary expenses or will affect the Jordanians people’s rights.

(2) Financial Scrutiny:

The Jordanian Constitution established that the Government shall submit the estimated annual General Budget to the National Assembly for approval.8 Government may not draw any funds from the Budget before it has been approved by Upper and Lower Houses. The two Houses are entitled to reduce the expenditure as in the Budget, other than those related to contracts and granted privileges for more than one year. The constitution has also granted the National Assembly the right to constantly oversee the State’s expenditures and revenues9 and has also stated the establishment of an Audit Bureau mandated solely with controlling the governmental spending of the Budget and transgression, and to annually report to the House.

(3) Political Oversight:

Political oversight aims to subject the executive authority—which involves the day to day and strategic matters of society—to effective oversight and control to improve the executive authority performance and to hold it accountable for the shortcomings. This is achieved through different influence tools at the Parliament’s disposal (El-Gamal, 1970:288). The National Assembly practices the oversight competences through the different oversight and control tools identified by the Jordanian Constitution to enable the Assembly members to monitor and oversee the government program's progress. Those tools include vote of confidence in the Government, investigation, debate request, expressing desire, query, interrogation and impeachment.

Article (90) of the 1952 Jordanian Constitution stated that every newly formed Government (Ministry) shall present a Ministerial Statement to the Chamber of Deputies on the Government plans of administering the public affairs and request a vote of confidence on the basis of the said statement.

Under Article (91) of the Jordanian Constitution, The Prime Minister shall refer to the Chamber of Deputies
any draft law, and the Chamber shall be entitled to accept, amend, or reject the draft law. However, in all cases, the Chamber shall refer the draft law to the Senate. No law may be promulgated unless passed by both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies and ratified by the King. If the National Assembly approves a provisional law, this changes its legal nature into normal standing law inherent to the legal structure of the State. Thus, it becomes legitimate law with final forcing power and shall not be challenged for abolition under the illegitimacy; however, it may be challenged for its unconstitutionality (Shatnawi, 2007:339).

The Jordanian Constitution ensured the Parliament’s freedom in forming parliamentary investigation committees assigned to investigate the charges against certain minister(s) and present indictment. Articles (55-57) of the amended constitution of 2011 stated that ministers shall be tried by competent regular courts in metropolitans for offenses that may be attributed to them in the course of the performance of their duties in accordance with the provisions of the law. The House of Representatives shall have the right to refer the Ministers to the Attorney General along with stating the justifying reasons. The decision of referral shall not be issued except by the majority of the House of Representatives members. The Minister who shall be indicted by the Attorney General upon the issuance of the decision of referral by the House of Representatives shall be suspended from office; his resignation shall not prevent the Institution of proceedings against him or the continuation of his trial10.

Section II: Election laws

In terms of importance, the election law is considered second only to the Constitution, as it is a fundamental pillar of the democratic system (Bani Salameh, 2016). When Jordan resumed the process of democratic transformation in 1989, it conducted parliamentary elections based on open lists law, which enables citizens to elect a number of candidates in the electoral district that is equal to the number of MB allocated to that electoral district (Frehat, 2011). This law allowed voters to bypass tribal and clan affiliations, and was thus considered very suitable to the development of partisan life (Rentawi, 2003). That law has produced a relatively strong Parliament, that was effective in its role in oversight and legislation, and was able to open some of the files of corruption, which were kept secret for many years (Mahafza, 2001).

However, in 1993, the state adopted a new law known as the one-vote law, which was issued in the form of a temporary law. The new law was intended to control the election results before elections are conducted. Its further aim was to emphasize the consecration and the dominance of power over society by the means of elections. Such law represented a setback for the democratic process and damaged the political life severely (Breizat, 2011). The one-vote law entrenched tribal, regional, sectarian and other sub-affiliations, and led to the weakening of political parties. Most importantly, it did not promote justice and equality among citizens. Furthermore, the one-vote law gave the government the precedence over the House of Representatives, which thus required the government to provide the benefits, advantages, grants and jobs for their supporters. The situation has reached the extent that the House of Representatives had cooperated with the government in the acquittal of a number of officials involved in corruption cases. The political forces in the country have tried to change the law by using various means, including boycotting the elections, as well as the use of courts, without any effect.

In an attempt to circumvent the popular demands, the one-vote law was amended more than once with the survival of the one-vote principle, such as the adoption of fake or artificial circuits system in 2010, and increasing the number of seats in the House of Representatives to 120 (Doha Institute, 2013). In 2012, a new election law was adopted, whereby 27 seats were allocated to the national lists of the House of Representatives that had a total of 150 seats, as a part of the regime's attempt to stimulate the political parties and push for more participation. However, the law did not limit the formation of the lists to political parties only, which could now consist of non-partisan members. This undermined the integrity of the parliamentary elections.

In general, we can say that these laws were inadequate, as they were unable to meet popular demands, where the elections held under these laws were devoid of any programmatic or even political competition. Moreover, the basic criterion for the election of a candidate depended on the strength and influence in his constituency based on the tribal and traditional foundations.

The strategy that the candidates used in their election campaigns with the House of Representatives viewed the Council as a municipality council that may offer
assistance and exercise the role of mediator between the voter and the ruling circles, and not on the basis that this Council is a supervisory authority, legislative body or policy maker.

It could be argued that the amendments to the election law that have taken place over two decades have contributed only to the continuation of the one-vote law. According to the organization Freedom House, the election law favors family and kinship ties in the political and ideological links (Freedom House, 2006). Similarly, based on the WikiLeaks documents, the reasons for lack of professionalism in the parliament can be traced directly to the one-vote system that encourages the franchise on a tribal basis (www.wiki.leaks, 2009). In sum, the election law failed and was unable to either consolidate the democratic process or produce new elites.

Section III: Profession and Job Characteristics of the MPs and Rate of Circulation during the Reign of King Hussein Bin Talal

The parliament is an important tool for the analysis of the Jordanian political arena reformation processes, as it reflects an image of the political alliances, balance of power and shifts the political regime. Furthermore, it expresses the logic of the Politics of Notables, their resources and mechanisms of action (Al-Otari, 2012:140), such as the use of money, diverse clientele, power, the use of tribal/clan power, speaking for the people and patronage. This is in line what Gaston Paul described as "Access to wealth" (Bouthol, 1982:89), or in the words of Michel Foucault, "The political power chance to re-discriminate and sort those who shall be accepted in the ‘political life’ and those who shall be excluded" (Foucault, 1990:45). Two key factors determine the social and political characteristics of the different elites: the nature of the ruling political regime, and the nature of the social structure. It is, therefore, posited that any change in the political regime or the social structure will most likely entail a change in the elite and in their social and political characteristics (Ghilani, 2012:119-120).

(1) Profession and Job Characteristics of Jordanian Parliamentary Elite

A number of social, economic, ideological and religious bases underpin selection of the parliamentary elite members. Each member belongs to a social class, tribe or a clan, and has a particular religious, partisan and profession affiliation. Furthermore, a parliamentary elite members’ attitudes and activities are affected by their personality traits. Individuals differ in their psychological qualities in terms of the nature and tendencies, and mental capacities reflected in their knowledge and qualifications, all of which influence their behaviors, including their political aspirations. In this section, we will present and analyze data pertaining to the process of parliamentary elite formation, considering the professional characteristics, and will identify the career path of the parliamentary elite. Based on these data, we can shape specific views on parliamentary elite circulation rate, as demonstrated in the Table 1.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage %</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed forces and security services</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>%8.7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>%8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior public servants</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>%22.5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>%30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>%13.7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>%15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional associations</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>%35</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>%33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>%6.2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>%6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>%13.7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>%6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>%100</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>%100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Prepared by the researchers based on the results of parliamentary elections, sourced from the archive of the House of Representatives.
The data presented in Table 1 shows that members of professional associations (i.e., associations of doctors, engineers, lawyers, and journalists) represented the greatest portion of the members of the House of Representatives in 1989, where 28 trade unionists successfully reached the Parliament, equivalent to 35% of all the MPs. Three presidents of unions joined the House of Representatives in their personal capacity. The number then decreased slightly in 1993, where 27 trade unionists won membership in the Parliament, representing 33.7% of the total number of members. In 1997, the number increased to 31 unionist members of parliament, which constituted 38.7% of the total number of MPs. The average percentage of MPs who were originally trade union members in the three parliaments was 35.8%.

When the membership in the three parliaments was examined to identify the number of public servants, 18 MPs of this background were noted in 1989, representing 22.5% of the total number of MPs, which in 1993 increased to 24 (30%) of all MPs. In 1997, the number declined dramatically to 13 members, or 16.2% of all MPs. The average percentage of MPs who were originally from the public sector in the three parliaments was 22.9%.

When the analysis focused on the number of university academics in the three parliaments, 11 MPs were noted in the 1989 parliament, or 13.7% of the total number of MPs. It then increased to 12 in 1993, representing 15% of all MPs, and finally to 13 (16.2%) in 1997. The average percentage of MPs in the three parliaments who had academic background was 15%.

Analysis of the three parliaments in terms of members who served in the armed or security forces revealed that there were 7 MPs of this background in both 1989 and 1993, representing 7.8% of the total. In 1997, their number increased to 18 (22.5%). The average percentage of MPs who were originally from the armed or security forces in the three parliaments was 13.3% of the total number of MPs.

Businessmen won 5 seats in both 1989 and 1993 parliaments, representing 6.2% of all MPs. In 1997, the number increased to 7 seats (8.7%). The average number of MPs who were originally serving in the armed or security forces in the three parliaments was 7.1.

MPs that came from the public sector won 11 (13.7%) seats in the 1989 parliament. In 1993, their number dramatically declined to 5 (6.2%). In 1997, only 4 (5%) remained. The average number of MPs who were originally from the public sector in the three parliaments was 8.3% of the total number of MPs.

Based on the aforementioned, we may say the parliamentary elites in Jordan differ in vision, agenda and strategy as a result of their varied professional background. Consequently, it is neither a coherent organization, nor a movement. It is one title encompassing different frameworks; some are limited to charity and voluntary activities, while others might go beyond that to include politics. The latter can be classified into three main trends—secular, Islamic and conciliatory trend—which is also called "Third Way Direction". Other frameworks might be economic that seek the parliamentary work as a formal coverage for their economic activities.

(2) Parliamentary Elite Circulation Rate

Elites can be classified according to their attitude toward change into open, closed, semi-open and semi-closed elite, depending on the number of times parliamentary members held posts and their duration. An elite is closed or semi-closed if its rate of circulation or change is slow, or a person stays in the same position for long duration. An elite is open or semi-open if its members change rapidly and frequently (Abu Esbaa', 1999:203-205), in which case the elite will be perceived as structurally changing rather than stationary, where circulation plays key role in the formation (Abul Khair, n.d).

There were five former deputies who were members of the so-called National Consultative Council before 1989, representing 6% of all MPs of the new House of Representatives. There were 75 new members, accounting for 94% of all MPs, with an elite circulation or replacement rate of 15 times. The 12th Parliament had 24 former MPs, which accounted for 30% of all MPs, whereas there were 56 new MPs, accounting for 70% of all MPs, with an elite circulation or replacement rate of 2.3 times.

In the 13th Parliament, the number of former MPs increased to 34, which accounted for 42.5% of all MPs, whereas there were 46 new MPs, accounting for 57.5% of all MPs, with an elite circulation or replacement rate of 1.3.

The total number of MPs who filled parliamentary seats in the period from 1989 to 2011 was 182, out of the total 240 MPs that formed the three Parliaments, 63 of whom were former MPs, representing 26.3% of all MPs, while 177 were new MPs, representing 73.3% of all MPs,
with an elite circulation or replacement rate of 2.8 times.

Can these percentages be viewed as an indication of parliamentary elite openness? In fact, the answer cannot be provided without reference to the number of those who held ministerial or governmental posts or served in the armed forces during the period of martial law and before 1989. Thus, all MPs who held governmental and ministerial posts are presented in Table 2, along with the circulation rate.

Table 2
Jordanian Parliamentary Elite Circulation Rate in the Reign of King Hussein

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parliament</th>
<th>Number of MPs</th>
<th>Number of new MPs</th>
<th>Their Percent of MPs</th>
<th>Number of former MPs</th>
<th>Their Percent of MPs</th>
<th>Circulation rate of new MPs</th>
<th>New MPs who previously held ministerial or public governmental posts</th>
<th>Their percent of MPs</th>
<th>Circulation rate of those who previously held posts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11th 1989–1993</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>%94</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>%6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th 1993–1997</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>%70</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>%30</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th 1997–2001</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>%57.5</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>%42.5</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>61.2%</td>
<td>1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>240</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>%73.7</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>%26.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>86.4%</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Prepared by the researchers based on the results of parliamentary elections sourced from the archive of the House of Representatives.

The figures shown in Table 2 indicate that the previous percentages, albeit partially indicative of the elites’ circulation, conceal the actual percentages of the governmental elite replacement in the parliamentary membership. If we consider the number of new MPs who have held ministerial or governmental posts or have served in the armed forces during the period of martial law prior to 1989, the rate of elite replacement and the parliamentary elite circulation process would be lower than the percentages shown in Table 2.

Table 2 shows that 16 former ministers won seats in the 11th Parliament, 21 MPs were in the position of head of department in governmental institutions and 21 have previously served in the armed forces and security services. In other words, of the 80 MPs, there were 48 who were from the public sector, representing %60 of the new MPs. This indicates that the total elite replacement rate in the parliament declined to 1.5 in 1989.

In the 12th Parliament, 14 former ministers and 13 public employees were MPs, whereas the number of those who served in the military increased to 29. In other words, there were 56 MPs from the public sector, accounting for %70 of the new MPs. This indicates that the elite replacement rate was 1.5 times, which is similar to the previous rates.

In the 13th Parliament, there were 49 public sector officials, including 17 former ministers, and 22 MPs who previously served in the armed forces, thus comprising %61.2 of the new MPs. This indicates an increase in the elite replacement rate to 1.54 times.

However, the overall number of new MPs whose job background is public sector was 153 (%86.4 of the parliamentary elite members), indicating an elite replacement rate of only 1.75, compared to 87 MPs who were newcomers to the parliamentary elite in the 1989–2001 period, denoting very slow renewal of the parliamentary elite in Jordan.

It is worth mentioning that the percentage of former ministers in the Jordanian parliament during the 1989–2001 period was %20 of MPs in 1989, which then decreased to %17.5 in the 1993 Parliament, followed by an increase to %21 in 1997. The average for the three parliaments was %23.7, signifying that approximately one quarter of MPs were former ministers.

Section IV: Profession and Job Characteristics of MPs and Their Rate of Circulation during the Reign of King Abdullah II Bin Al-Hussein

Additionally, the parliament was disrupted for two years (2001–2003) when the parliamentary elections were postponed. One Parliament has completed its constitutional mandate (the 14th: 2003–2007).

(1) The Profession and Job Affiliation of Parliamentary Elites

### Table (3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed forces and security services</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior public servants</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals associations</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Prepared by the researchers based on the results of parliamentary elections, sourced from the archive of the House of Representatives.

MPs descending from the public sector were in the first rank, as 35 served as MPs in 2003, accounting for %31.8 of all MPs, including a former prime minister, 10 former ministers and two former senators, whereas 27 were former MPs (Afif, 2013:154).

As this comprised %30.9 of the 15th Parliament, the percentage stayed within the range of the previous corresponding percentages. However, it then witnessed a dramatic increase in the ensuing 16th parliamentary elections, where 50 MPs from the public sector won, representing %41.6 of all MPs. Grossly falsifying the election results at that time has contributed to this large number of seats won. In the 17th parliamentary elections, the percentage decreased to %30, as 45 MPs from public sector won elections. Their average for the four parliaments was %33.5 of all MPs.

In the second rank were members of professional associations (doctors, engineers, lawyers and journalists), as the general average for the four parliaments was %16.07 of all MP, since 53 members of professional associations won elections, equivalent to %48 of all MPs. Six presidents of unions stood for elections, including four from professional associations and two from trade unions. However, none of them won (Barakat, 2003:6).

In the 2007 Parliament, the percentage dramatically declined, were 10 members of professional associations won elections, accounting for %9 of all MPs. The direct cause might have been that professional associations had decided to boycott the parliamentary elections. A further decrease took place in the parliamentary elections for the 2010–2012 Parliament, where only four members of professional associations won, accounting for %3.3 of all MPs. In the 2013 elections, there was a slight rise, when 6 members won, accounting for %4 of all MPs.

In the third rank were members serving in the armed forces. Their general average along the four parliaments was %16.7 of all MPs, as 12 won parliamentary elections in 2003, representing %10.9 of all MPs. The number then increased to 25 (%22.7) MPs in the 2007 Parliament. It then decreased to 17 MPs in the 2010 Parliament, accounting for %14.1 of all MPs. In the 2013 elections, the number slightly increased, as 29 of members serving in the armed forces won elections, accounting for %19.3 of all MPs.

Members who were businessmen were ranked fourth, as they represented %14.7 of the total number of MPs. Businessmen won two seats in the 14th Parliament, accounting for %1.8 of MPs, with an increase of three seats (%4.5) in the 15th Parliament, followed by a very dramatic increase in the 16th Parliament, when businessmen won 27 (%22.5) seats. In the 17th Parliament, they won 45 seats, equivalent to %30 of all seats. This marked a major turning point in Jordan, since it was an unprecedented coupling of wealth and power, as
Now, businessmen turned into politicians.

Next, in the fifth rank were members from the public sector who won three seats, representing %2.7 of the 14th Parliament members. In the 15th Parliament, their number increased to 22 (%20) seats, followed by decrease to 13 seats in the 16th Parliament, i.e., %10.8 of all MPs. In the 17th Parliament, businessmen won 23 (%15.3) seats. Their general average along the four parliaments was %12.2 of all MPs.

University academics were ranked the last. They did not win seats in the 14th Parliament, but then won 4 seats, equivalent to %3.6 of MPs in the 15th Parliament, followed by 9 (%7.5) seats in the 16th Parliament. The number then increased to 13 MPs (%8.6) in the 17th Parliament. Their general average along the four parliaments was %4.9 of all MPs.

The analyses of the elite members presented above highlight the existence of a high occupational mobility resulting from a combination of multiple factors, some of which are related to the area and stage in which they joined work, while other factors are related to personal characteristics, such as joining work at a relatively early age. This explains how the majority of the elite had considerable professional experience, as most of them spent long periods of time in their career; periods that were eventful and rich in transitions that crystallized the modern Jordanian society as well as the parliamentary movement.

(2) Parliamentary Elite Circulation Rate

Recruitment is associated with the level of elite openness and acceptance of new members, while others leave on a regular basis, whether this replacement is accomplished by elections or appointment, and the intervals at which elite circulation is completed by elections of appointment. In other words, is this circulation frequent or does it occur only due to exceptional circumstances? It is beyond doubt that a finer degree of democracy is represented by greater elite circulation, especially when it is determined by free elections. This is in contrast to circulation taking place by predetermined lists, disguised appointment, referendum, or even formal elections through election coalitions.12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parliament</th>
<th>Number of MPs</th>
<th>Number of new MPs</th>
<th>Their Percent of MPs</th>
<th>Number of former MPs</th>
<th>Their Percent of MPs</th>
<th>Circulation rate of new MPs</th>
<th>New MPs who previously held ministerial or public governmental posts</th>
<th>Their percent of MPs</th>
<th>Circulation rate of those who previously held posts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14th -2003 (2007)</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>%42.7</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>%57.2</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>%30.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th -2007 (2009)</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>%52.7</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>%47.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>%47.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th -2010 (2012)</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>%65</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>%35</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>%26.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th -2013 (2016)</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>%62</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>%38</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>%30.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>%55.6</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>%54.4</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>%31.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Prepared by the researchers based on the published results of parliamentary elections.

There were 63 former MPs in the 14th Parliament of 2003, representing %57.2 of the total number of MPs (110), whereas there were 47 new MPs, equivalent to %42.7 of all MPs. The elite circulation rate was 0.74.

In the 15th Parliament of 2007, there were 58 new MPs, representing %52.7 of the total number of MPs (110), whereas there were 52 former MPs, representing %47.3 of all MPs. The elite circulation rate was 1.1.

In the 16th Parliament of 2010, 78 new MPs joined and accounted for %65 of the 120 MPs, whereas there
were 32 former MPs accounting for %35 of all MPs (Zaytuna Center for Studies and Consultations, 2010). The elite circulation rate was 2.4.

In the 17th Parliament of 2013, 88 new MPs joined and accounted for %62 of all MPs, compared to 58 former MPs, accounting for %38. The elite circulation rate was 1.4.

These changes in the parliament were imposed by the emergence of two blocks—one representing the new MPs and the other representing the former MPs. This, in turn, reflected on the progress of the work of the parliament, particularly that relating to the election of the Speaker of the Parliament, the election of members of the Permanent Bureau of the Parliament, and the formation of the active committees (chairpersons and members). This parliament composition was also strongly reflected in the consultations held by the Prime Minister Abdullah Al-Nusour in his second government.

The total number of MPs who occupied parliamentary seats in the period between 2003 and 2013 was 490, 271 of whom were new members, accounting for %55.6 of all MPs, while 219 (%44.4) were former MPs. The elite circulation rate was 1.29.

The elite replacement rate in the parliament was also derived from the number of new MPs who had previously assumed ministerial or governmental posts—whether in the civil governmental departments or in the armed forces—within the period from 2003 to 2013. In this case, the elite replacement rate among parliamentary elites is largely lower than the figures presented in Table 4.

We find that 14 former ministers won the elections of the 14th Parliament, as well as 10 MPs who had worked as managers in governmental institutions and 10 MPs who served as senior officers in the armed forces and security services. This means that 34 of the 110 MPs originally worked in the public sector, accounting for %30.9 of all MPs. This indicates an elite replacement rate of 4.4 of the total number of MPs.

Seventeen former ministers won the elections of the 15th Parliament (2007–2009), as well as 13 government officials, with an increase in the number of those serving in the army to 12 MPs, making a total of 42 MPs from the public sector, accounting for %35 of the new MPs. This indicates an elite replacement rate of 8.9 times of the total number of MPs.

In the 16th Parliament (2010–2012), 13 public servants won seats, as well as 10 former ministers and 9 MPs who had been serving in the armed forces, making a total of 32 MPs from the public sector, representing %26.6 of the new MPs. This indicates an elite replacement rate of 3.6.

In the 17th Parliament, 37 public servants won seats, 11 of whom were former ministers, 12 came from the armed forces and 15 were senior public sector officials. They represented %24.6 of all new MPs, indicating an elite circulation rate of 3.2.

However, the total number of new MPs with a public sector job background was 155, accounting for %31.6 of all parliamentary elite members, with an elite replacement rate of 4.6.

It is worth mentioning that the percentage of former ministers in the Parliament of Jordan was %12.7 in 2003, after which it increased to %15.4 in the Parliament of 2007, followed by a major decrease to %8.3 in 2010, with further slight decrease to %7.3 in the Parliament of 2012. This results in the general average of former minister MPs along the three parliamentary cycles of %10.9.

The authors are of view that the public service continues to be a political job, since those in these positions remain loyal to the supreme political elites in the state, rather than to the people who voted for them. The State will often direct those MPs to achieve the State’s goals and support the public policies. That segment has remained a main foundation of parliamentary elites and has become the largest and most important relatively recent segment from which the various parliamentary political elites emanate.

Section V: The Parliamentary Elites: A Comparison between the Reigns of King Hussein and that of King Abdullah II

(1) Comparing the Profession and Job Characteristics of Parliamentary Elites

The above table shows that the parliamentary elite formed by the members of professional associations was the biggest loser in the changes to the Jordanian Parliament composition. Their average during the reign of King Hussein was % 35.8 of the MPs, declining to %16.07 of the Parliaments formed during King Abdullah II. This decline might be attributed to several factors, especially the governmental interference in the 2007 election results, and the parliamentary election boycott in 2010.

The parliamentary elite with academic background was ranked second in the regression as the percentage declined from %15 during the King Hussein reign to %4.9 during the reign of King Abdullah II.
Table (5)
Comparison of the Profession and Job Characteristics of the Parliamentary Elite in the Two Reigns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profession</th>
<th>General average of Parliaments during the reign of King Hussein Bin Talal</th>
<th>General average of Parliaments during the reign of King Abdullah II</th>
<th>Percentage of change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed forces and security services</td>
<td>%13.3</td>
<td>%16.7</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior public officials</td>
<td>%22.9</td>
<td>%33.5</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Academics</td>
<td>%15</td>
<td>%4.9</td>
<td>-10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional associations</td>
<td>%35.8</td>
<td>%16.07</td>
<td>-19.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
<td>%7.1</td>
<td>%14.7</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector</td>
<td>%8.3</td>
<td>%12.2</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>%2.06</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>%100</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Prepared by the researchers based on the previous tables on Profession and Job Characteristics, after calculation of the averages.

In fact, the security, interference in the faculty members, and the recent escalation of such intervention might have had a direct impact on the reluctance of a large number of academics to stand in elections or to profess their academic views in the political affairs.

The parliamentary elites from the public sector were the best winners, since during the King Hussein reign they represented %22.9, which increased to %33.5 during the reign of King Abdullah II. Perhaps the single-vote system had a direct impact on this change, as polls revealed that the majority of citizens were seeking service-oriented MPs, with the view that senior public officials are the most capable to meet such serviceability demands.

Parliamentary elite with business background came next, as their percentage moved up from % 7.1 during the reign of King Hussein to %14.7 during the King Abdullah II era. The political money might have had a direct impact on this change.

In the third rank was the parliamentary elite that served in the armed forces and security service. Their percentage increased from %13.3 in the reign of King Hussein to %16.7 in the reign of King Abdullah II. The positive outlook of Jordanian citizens toward members of the armed forces likely had a direct impact of this change.

Parliamentary elite that previously worked in the public sector ranked the lowest, since their percentage during the King Hussein reign was %8.3 and increased to %12.2 during the reign of King Abdullah II. The direct impact of this change may be attributed to the State’s tendency to establish partnerships with the public sector.

(2) Parliamentary Elite Circulation Rate

Table (6)
Comparison of the Jordanian Parliamentary Elite Circulation during the Two Reigns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parliament during the reign of King Hussein</th>
<th>Elite circulation rate during the reign of King Hussein</th>
<th>Parliament in the reign of King Abdullah</th>
<th>Elite circulation rate during the reign of King Abdullah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11th</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14th</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>15th</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>16th</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17th</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2013–2016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General average of parliaments</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Prepared by the researchers based on the findings in tables of the parliamentary elite circulation.
The above table demonstrates that the rate of parliamentary elite circulation during the reign of King Hussein was higher than that during the reign of King Abdullah II, since the former was 2.8 times along the three formed parliaments, whereas the latter was 1.29 times.

The highest rate (15) was noted in the Parliament of Jordan formed in 1989, while the lowest (1.1) was associated with the 15th Parliament of 2007. The reason for this change is that there was an extremely high voter and candidate turnover in the 2007 parliamentary elections, in addition to the transparency of the electoral process. In contrast, the 2007 parliamentary elections were boycotted by parties and unions, in addition to undermined integrity and fairness of the process.

**Study findings**

The main study findings are summarized below:

1. The aforementioned analysis of the parliamentary elite circulation shows that the circulation rate is rather internal from one job position to another, in what can be described as a very limited circulation. The former elites still dominate the different official political and economic positions, and parliamentary elites that assumed senior positions of the State, namely the executive power, are in control of the parliamentary variety. The researchers believe that the reason for this is that those elites have been providing service and protecting the interest of their districts at the expense of the other areas—the practice that makes the voters perceive them as being more capable of being helpful and meeting their serviceability and personal demands.

2. The study revealed that, in many cases, the elite circulation or replacement rate is not associated with a significant shift in the profession and job characteristics, indicating that the elite circulation rate does not necessarily lead to concomitant real renewal of profession and job characteristics.

3. The parliamentary elite profession and job features remained the same in the two reigns. This may be attributed to the fact that the parliamentary composition stems from the profession and jobs of the MPs, rather than being driven by their personal competence and publicity. In fact, the Jordanian citizens still view the parliament from a serviceability rather than legislative and scrutiny perspective. This is strongly related to the voters’ mentality of considering the MPs who are more capable of providing service and patronage, rather than voting for those that are more capable in terms of legislations and scrutiny. Therefore, the previous experience of MPs is a key factor in the voters’ choice.

4. The study revealed evidence that the parliamentary elite is heterogeneous in structure and not politically integral or coherent; neither do they share a common ideology or a political or economic grounds. In fact, they are diverse in tendency, ideology and economic class. This might be caused by the weak partisan structure, absence of a joint political agenda and the dominance of tribal-regional nature. Moreover, the elite circulation rate has sometimes contributed to introducing new members to the Parliament, but without an in-depth change in profession and job characteristics. This demonstrates regression and weakness in the civil society institutions representation as represented by the unions (associations).

5. Working for the government and military institutions was and remains the key factor in the emergence of the various Jordanian parliamentary elites. The rate of elite circulation and their influence was and remains determined by their relation and extent of proximity to the Elements of the Regime. Most of the parliamentary elites combine several positions in the civil, military and economic institutions, as well as in the trade unions, and most have predominantly held those positions for long periods. The parliamentary elite circulation—similar to the State’s senior official circulation—is based on criteria determined by the State’s interventions, rather than by general elections.

The 11th and 17th Parliament were found to be the most important parliaments in Jordan's political life. The 11th Parliament derives its importance from the fact that it was established upon parliamentary elections that were held following more than two-decade-long interruption of elections as a result of the inability to hold parliamentary elections in the West Bank. It was also concurrent with turmoil in a number of Jordanian cities due to poor economic conditions, declining Jordanian Dinar exchange rate, aggravation of poverty and unemployment, the decision of administrative and legal disengagement with the West Bank, the worsening relationship between the opposition and the regime and heightened popular discontent over the government policies, and the deteriorating economic situation and livelihood. All these factors led to the emergence of the notion of “democratization” in Jordan in 1989, by holding free and impartial elections. With respect to the 17th Parliament, it
derives its importance from the fact that it was elected following a period of a public distrust in the election process impartiality for successive previous parliaments, in addition to the attenuated economic situation and low standard of living, concurrent with the “Arab Spring” waves and the reform steps announced by the State—through the formation of the National Dialogue Committee—and constitutional amendments and the establishment of the Independent Commission for Elections. Consequently, people aspired to a parliament-to-be that shall reflect their will and hopes in achieving a real and substantial economic and political development, including the elite renewal. However, a thorough review of the tables reveals the following:

In 1989 (within the reign of King Hussein), the elite circulation rate (15) was high, as 75 new MPs joined the parliament, even if the majority shared a common profession and job background. This rate reflects the context of that stage and has also altered the elite structure, since %35 of MPs came from trade unions, whereas the percentage of MPs from the military and security institutions declined to %8.7. The public officials accounted for %22.5 of the parliament.

In contrast, the elite circulation rate in the 17th Parliament (within the reign of King Abdullah II) was 1.5, as it included 62 formed MPs who rejoined versus 88 new MPs, including a noticeable advancement of the capital as represented by the businessmen, who accounted for %30 of MPs. This is an indicator that the voters had become more economically oriented than politically oriented. Likewise, it shows that the mobility in Jordan was essentially economically driven by the subsequent political drive. The percentage of trade union representatives not exceeding %4 justifies this view.

A comparison of the SMA (Simple Moving Average) of MPs with military or security background and senior public officials during both reigns shows a considerable increase during the King Abdullah II reign compared to the reign of King Hussein, and conversely for the trade union representation, which declined during the King Abdullah II reign.

Results further revealed that the overall circulation percentage during the reign of King Abdullah II was %1.29, compared to %2.8 during the reign of King Hussein. The study findings also reveal that the key factor behind that might be that certain State institutions were controlling the election results in the past years, thus diminishing the circulation process to a fair extent.

6. Based on the foregoing, the study annulled the hypothesis. It showed that the realization of a number of transitions on the path to democracy (amending more than two thirds of the constitution, establishment of the Independent Elections Commission, the Judicial Independence Law and Political Parties Law) did not affect the real circulation of parliamentary elite. The high number of senior State officials and former ministers among the MPs brought about two contradicting outcomes. First, their expertise and knowledge in legislation and law enactment was adequate, which resulted in more comprehensive laws with fewer gaps. Second, the Parliament was unable to produce laws beyond the scope of the executive power domination. This explains the passing of laws that were considerably biased toward the capital and investor interests while overlooking the social dimension.

7. The study unveiled a pivotal issue, which is the emergence of a number of variables that have affected the parliamentary elite circulation to different degrees. Those are:

a) The Jordanian citizens’ political orientation and value of service provision: This variable is largely related to the nature of political culture in Jordan from the standpoint of the service value expected to be provided by the parliament candidates and the extent to which the candidate can guard their domestic interests. Thus, it is a service-based culture in the first place, where the voter perceives an MP as a service provider and interest caretaker. Indeed, this largely explains why the MPs holding governmental and public sector jobs constitute the central base in the parliamentary elite structure.

b) Manipulations of elections and lack of integrity and transparency for successive parliaments have played a role in the persistence of certain elite features, namely former senior state officials.

c) Public job: The main, but not the only, pillar for those seeking parliamentary work, and one of the most important factors of the elite formation and composition.

The bottom line is that there is a relationship between the independent variable of the profession and job characteristics of MPs with the three mediating variables noted above, which in turn affect—to a different extent—the dependent variable of the parliamentary elite circulation.

The foregoing reveals the reality of equilibrium between the legislative and the executive powers, the parties’ reality, and one of the main reasons for the
weakness of the party within the framework of the Jordanian political system in the light of how the parliamentary elites are being formed.

"The natural as well as social sciences always start from problems, from the fact that something inspires amazement in us, as the Greek philosophers used to say." as Karl Popper said (Karl Popper, 1999: 3). Thus, the authors of this study propose further studies addressing an important problem to answer the following key question:

“What dimensions might be harbored by the mechanisms of creating parliamentary elite from the profession and job characteristic perspective leading to weakening political parties and sustainment of the executive power dominance over the political system?”

NOTS

(1) Democratization, simply put, is the transition of political regime from a non-democratic regime—whether a monarchy, absolute republican, authoritarian militarily, authoritarian theocratic or one-party ruling system—to a democratic regime characterized by openness, pluralism, political participation, and respect for human rights, among other principles and values of democracy. See: Mohammad Bani Salameh, the democratization process in the Sultanate of Oman, Al-Manara Journal, Volume 13, Issue 7, 2007, p. 62.

(2) The economic crisis that affected the Jordanian economy in 1989 represented the beginning of democratic transition in Jordan.


(4) The Basic Law of the Emirate of Transjordan of 1928 did not entitle the Legislative Council to propose laws, and it did not have political powers. The law granted the Council the right to approve draft laws proposed by the Prime Minister or the head of certain authority. It has also granted the Council some powers in financial matters, the most important of which was the authority to approve the State Budget Law. See: Adel Al-Heyary, Constitutional law and political systems (comparative study, Amman, 1972, p. 526-532).

(5) According to Article 64 of the Jordanian Constitution of 1952, a Senator must have completed forty calendar years of age and must belong to one of the following classes: Present and former Prime Ministers and Ministers, persons who had previously held the office of Ambassador, Minister Plenipotentiary, Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, President and judges of the Court of Cassation and of the Civil and Sharia Courts of Appeal, retired military officers of the rank of Lt. General and above, former Deputies who were elected at least twice as deputies, and other similar personalities who enjoy the confidence of the people in view of the services rendered by them to the Nation and the Country.

(6) Jordanian House of Representatives, the Jordanian Constitution and its amendments in 2011, the Jordanian National Assembly website.

(7) Pursuant to provisions of Article (73) of the Jordanian Constitution.


(10) Article (55) of the Constitution of 1952 was abolished. It stated that: "Ministers shall be tried by a High Tribunal for offences which may be attributed to them in the course of the performance of their duties". Article (56) of the Constitution of 1952 was also abolished. It stated that: "The Chamber of Deputies is entitled to impeach Ministers, but a bill of impeachment shall not be passed except by a majority of two-thirds of the members of the Chamber. The Chamber of Deputies shall appoint, from among its members, deputies who shall present the impeachment to, and proceed before, the High Tribunal". Article (58) of the Constitution of 1952, which was abolished reads: "The High Tribunal shall apply the provisions of the Penal Code in force in
respect of offences specified therein. A special law shall specify the offences for which Ministers shall be responsible in cases where such offences are not covered by the Penal Code. Article (61) of the Constitution of 1952 was also abolished. It read: "A Minister who is impeached by the Chamber of Deputies shall be suspended from office until his case is determined by the High Tribunal. His resignation shall not prevent the institution of criminal proceedings against him, or the continuance of his trial". Thus, the constitutional amendments have abolished the High Tribunal power to prosecute ministers from the date of entry into force and only the Constitutional Court is competent to interpret the provisions of the Constitution if so requested by the decision of the Council of Ministers or by a decision of either house of National Assembly.

(11) The study authors note that its members were appointed by the King without holding parliamentary elections.


REFERENCES


Abrash, I. K. (2012), Political Sociology, Judge Ayyad University, Faculty of Arts and Humanities, Marrakech, Wednesday, May 16, 2012, retrieved from: http://socio-kech.blogspot.com/2012/05/blog-post_5196.html. (in Arabic)


Abul Khair, O., Feminist Elite. 'Sociological Vision', (in Arabic), Journal of Democracy online: retrieved from: democracy.ahram.org.eg/UI/Front/.


Al-Barghouthi, S. (2009), The Palestinian political elite characteristics before and after the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority, Zaytuna Center for Studies and Consultations, Beirut. (in Arabic)

Al-Heyary, A. (1972), Constitutional law and political systems, (comparative study), Amman. (in Arabic)


Ansar, P. (1992), Contemporary social science. Translated by Nakhla Friver, First Edition, the Arab Cultural Center, Beirut, Lebanon. (in Arabic)


Barakat, N. (2003), Representative Function of the Parliament in Jordan, the United Nations Development Programme on Governance in the Arab Region. (in Arabic)


Brezza, F. (2011), Jordanian Elections: Concentration of Authority Without Democracy, Doha Institute, Qatar.


El-Gamal, Y. (1970), The Constitutional System in Kuwait, Kuwait University publications. (in Arabic)

Evans, G. & Newham, J., The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, retrieved from: http://elibrary.grc.to/ar/penguin/page_5_0.htm


Ibrahim, S. E. et al. (1996), Society and the State in the Arab world, the Arab Unity Study Center, Beirut, Second Edition. (in Arabic).

Jordanian House of Representatives, the Jordanian Constitution and its amendments in 2011.


Khalil, M. (1971), Political systems and constitutional law, Amman, Part 1. (in Arabic)

King Hussein's speech at the Royal Commission for the formulation of the National Charter on 04/10/1990.


Rentawi, O. (2003), Jordanian Political Parties, Jerusalem Center for Political Studies, Amman, Jordan.


Speech from the Throne at the opening of the second regular session of the 11th National Assembly of Jordan, 17/11/1990.

Speech from the Throne at the opening of the second regular session of the 11th National Assembly of Jordan, 17/11/1990.

Yousuf, N. (1985), The Theory in International Relations, the Arab Book House, Beirut, First Edition. (in Arabic)


دوران النخبة دراسة حالة البرلمان الأردني

خالد عيسى العدوان، محمد تركي بني سلامة، عماد الشدوح

ملخص

هدفت هذه الدراسة محاولة التعرف إلى حدود دور النخبة البرلمانية في مجلس النواب الأردني بالمقارنة مع الخصائص المهنية والوظيفية لهذه النخب، وذلك بالمقارنة ما بين عهد الملك حسين، والملك عبد الله الثاني، وأنها في معدل الدوران، في سياق فرضية الدراسة القائمة على وجود علاقة طردية بين ما جرى من تحولات على صعيد الإصلاح في الدولة، وأنه في إحداث تحولات بنية حقيقية على النخب البرلمانية من حيث دورها وتغيير خصائصها المهنية والوظيفية، وتحقيق غايات الدراسة، استخدمت الدراسة منهج النخب السياسية والمنهج المقارن، وتوصلت الدراسة إلى العديد من النتائج، أهمها:

1. أن تقلّد المناصب والوظائف العامة هو الركيزة الأهم في تكوين بنية النخب البرلمانية، وأن الدراسة تحدثت الفرضية التي هدفت إلى معالجتها، حيث إن إحداث بعض التحولات على صعيد الإصلاح لم يعكس بشكل مؤثر على إحداث تحول ذي معنى في بنية النخبة البرلمانية من المنظور الوظيفي والمهني.

الكلمات الدالة: معدل دوران النخبة البرلمانية، الخصائص المهنية والوظيفية.

* قسم العلوم السياسية، جامعة اليرموك، الأردن؛ ومركز بلا قيود للدراسات والإبحاث البرلمانية والسياسية، الأردن. تاريخ استلام البحث 13/7/2016، وتاريخ قبوله 8/11/2016.