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<b>%50</b>			
60	100	119	
49	85	98	
37	67	73	
28	49	55	
39	70	77	
28	53	56	
21	36	41	
17	27	33	
11	18	21	/
10	16	19	
9	14	17	
10	12	19	

<b>%50</b>			
8	15	16	
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(2)

%71.4	217		
%28.6	87		
%11.5	35	30	
%27.6	84	40-31	
%42.1	128	50-41	
%18.8	57	51	
%42.8	130		
%48.7	148		
%8.6	26		
%15.1	46	5	
%31.9	97	10-6	
%36.2	110	15-11	
%16.8	51	16	

(%48.7)

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38-40		

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(Cronbach Alpha)

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0.8936	( )	25-1
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(Mukul asher, 2007)

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Corporate Social

Responsibility (CSR)

.(Hopkins, 2000)

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Corporate Governance

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(Sophie and Richard, 2007)

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.(Keefer, 2004: 4) "

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" (Demirag. et al., 2000)

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(Freeland, 2007)

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 2004 (OECD)

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 " (Coursey and Pabdey, 2007)

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		%80 .3		"
.1999		%56	24	(Perry, 1996)
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			(274)	
2003	%28			
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		.5		
"	(Bradley, 2003)			
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			"	(Andreassen, 2007)
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			"	(Jeremias, 2005)
			"	
	(Kleemann and Matuschek, 2002)		"	
"			"	(Tina, et.al, 2004)
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		Sarbanes-)		
		3)	(17)	(Oxley Act
		(	6	7
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			%69	.1
			%62	
"	(Klapper and Love, 2002)			.2
"				
			2003	%4

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(CLSA)

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(374)

(1998)

" (Sansom, 2001)

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Mallor

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(5)

	1	0.72	4.00		4-1
	2	0.71	3.94		8-5
	6	0.86	3.51		13-9
	5	0.81	3.53		17-14
	3	0.80	3.71		21-18

	4	0.83	3.62		25-22
	-	0.51	3.72		25-1

(3.62) (5)  
 (3.53)  
 (3.72)  
 (3.51)

: . (3.94) (4.00)

(3.71)

(6)

	2	1.033	3.73		26-27
	3	0.957	3.66		28-31
	1	0.903	3.77		32-34
	5	1.165	3.59		35-37
	4	1.000	3.61		38-40
	-	0.876	3.67		40-26

(6)

:  
 : (3.67)  
 ( $\alpha \geq 0.05$ )

( (3.77)  
 (3.73)  
 (3.66)

: (3.62)

(3.59)

"Multi-Collinearity"  
 Variance Inflation "

"Tolerance"  
 (7)

"Factor- VIF

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(VIF) (10) (VIF)

(2.263– 1.314) (10) "Tolerance" (0.05)

"Tolerance" (0.05)

– 0.313 (0.561 "Multicollinearity" (7)

(7)

Skewness	(VIF)	Tolerance	
0.370	1.404	0.313	
0.210	2.156	0.464	
0.266	1.314	0.561	
0.337	2.160	0.463	
0.395	2.255	0.443	
0.287	2.263	0.418	

Normal  
(1) Distribution  
(7) (Skewness)

(8)

**(Analysis Of variance)**

F	F			R <sup>2</sup>			
0.000	*118.49	10.181	61.087	0.657	(297 6)		( )
		0.107	31.878				
0.000	*45.55	9.027	54.161	0.424	(297 6)		
		0.248	73.722				
0.000	*33.909	7.884	47.302	0.354	(297 6)		
		0.291	86.487				
0.000	*62.97	10.139	60.832	0.505	(297 6)		
		0.201	59.735				
0.000	*60.15	14.200	85.198	0.492	(297 6)		
		0.296	87.819				
0.000	*61.84	12.647	75.881	0.499	(297 6)		
		0.256	76.077				

.(0.05≥ α) \*

(%50.5) (8)  
 (%49.2) ( ) (F)  
 ( ) ( ) 6) (0.05 ≥ α)  
 ( ) (%49.9) (297)  
 ( ) (%65.7)  
 ( ) (%42.4)  
 ( ) (%35.4)  
 (9)

t	t	Beta		B	
0.000	*7.665	0.350	0.041	0.315	
0.000	*4.816	0.215	0.045	0.216	
0.004	*2.905	0.101	0.021	0.062	
0.001	*3.434	0.153	0.044	0.151	
0.013	*2.496	0.090	0.026	0.064	
0.000	*5.176	0.237	0.041	0.210	

.(0.05 ≥ α) \*

(9)  
 (10) ) (t)  
 (%50.7) ( )  
 (%60.3) 3.434 2.905 4.816 7.665) (t)  
 (%63.5) a) (5.176)  
 ( ) .(0.01 ≥ α)  
 (%64.6) (2.496) (t)  
 .(0.05 ≥ α)  
 (%65.1) : :  
 (0.05 ≥ α)  
 (%65.7) )  
 ( )  
 :  
 (α ≥ 0.05) (Stepwise  
 ) Multiple Regression)  
 ( )  
 ( )



(10)  
"Stepwise Multiple Regression"

*t	t	R <sup>2</sup>	
0.000	*9.307	0.507	
0.000	*6.548	0.603	
0.000	*5.680	0.635	
0.000	*5.352	0.646	
0.000	*5.172	0.651	
0.000	*3.371	0.657	

.(0.05 ≥ α) \*

(11)

t	t	Beta		B	
0.000	*4.038	0.234	0.068	0.275	
0.000	*3.860	0.229	0.062	0.241	
0.002	*3.163	0.143	0.032	0.102	
0.061	*1.880	0.109	0.067	0.126	
0.105	**1.625	0.076	0.039	0.064	
0.000	*3.678	0.218	0.062	0.227	

.(α ≥ 0.05) \*

: (11) (t) ) (0.05 ≥ α) (

(t) (3.678 3.163 3.860 4.038) ) (0.01 ≥ α) (

(Stepwise

Multiple Regression)

(1.880 1.625) (t) ) (0.05 ≥ α)

(%36.7)

(

(%40.1)

(12)

(%41.3)

(%31.1)

(12)

"Stepwise Multiple Regression "

*t	t	R <sup>2</sup>	
0.000	*7.002	0.311	
0.000	*5.784	0.367	
0.000	*4.932	0.401	
0.006	*2.767	0.413	

.(0.05≥α)

\*

( )

(13)

t	t	Beta		B	
0.000	*6.564	0.413	0.068	0.443	
0.034	*2.133	0.131	0.074	0.157	
0.986	***0.017	0.001	0.035	0.0006	
0.368	***0.902	0.055	0.072	0.065	
0.077	***1.771	0.087	0.042	0.075	
0.656	***0.445	0.028	0.067	0.029	

.(0.05≥α)

\*

.(0.05≥α)

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(t)

( )

:  
(α≥0.05)

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(6.564)

(t)

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.(0.01≥α)

(13)

(Stepwise

Multiple Regression)

(2.133)

(t)

.(0.05≥α)

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(0.445 0.902 0.017 1.771)

(t)

(14)

:

.(0.05≥α)

(%31.5)

:

(0.05≥α)

(%34.5)

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(14)

"Stepwise Multiple Regression "

*t	t	R <sup>2</sup>	
0.000	*9.188	0.315	
0.000	*4.126	0.345	

.(0.05≥α)

\*

.(

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(15)

t	t	Beta		B	
0.000	*6.606	0.363	0.055	0.367	
0.001	*3.499	0.192	0.056	0.197	
0.937	*0.079	0.003	0.029	0.002	
0.213	*1.249	0.054	0.035	0.044	
0.880	*0.151	0.008	0.061	0.009	
0.000	*4.112	0.221	0.060	0.248	

.(0.05≥α)

\*

)  
 (  $(\alpha \geq 0.05)$  )  
 (  $(\alpha \geq 0.05)$  )  
 (Stepwise Multiple Regression)  
 (15)  
 ) (t)  
 (  $(\alpha \geq 0.05)$  )  
 (16) 3.499 6.606 (t)  
 (%42.3) ) (4.112  
 .(0.05 $\geq$  $\alpha$ )  
 (%48.6) (  $(\alpha \geq 0.05)$  )  
 (0.151 1.249 0.079) (t)  
 (%50.2) .(0.05 $\geq$  $\alpha$ )  
 ) :  
 ) :  
 (  $(0.05 \geq \alpha)$  )  
 (  $(\alpha \geq 0.05)$  )

(16)  
 "Stepwise Multiple Regression "

*t	t	R <sup>2</sup>	
0.000	*9.909	0.423	
0.000	*6.768	0.486	
0.000	*4.606	0.502	

.(0.05 $\geq$  $\alpha$ ) \*

.( )

( :  
 $(\alpha \geq 0.05)$  )

(17)

t	t	Beta		B	
0.000	*5.184	0.282	0.074	0.385	
0.000	*4.445	0.248	0.068	0.302	
0.001	*3.386	0.144	0.035	0.120	
0.109	*1.606	0.088	0.073	0.117	
0.444	**0.767	0.034	0.043	0.033	
0.000	*4.601	0.256	0.067	0.309	

.(0.05≥α) \*

( ) (17) (t) ( )

(18)

(%37)

(t)

(4.601 3.386 4.445 5.184)

.(0.05≥α)

(%43.6)

( )

(%47.4)

(0.767 1.606) (t)

(%48.8)

.(0.05≥α)

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( ) (0.05≥α)

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(α≥0.05)

( )

( (Stepwise

Multiple Regression)

(18)  
"Stepwise Multiple Regression "

*t	t	R <sup>2</sup>	
0.000	*8.131	0.370	
0.000	*6.636	0.436	
0.000	*5.672	0.474	
0.000	*4.685	0.488	

.(0.05≥α) \*

.( )

(19)

t	t	Beta		B	
0.000	*6.442	0.356	0.063	0.408	
0.002	*3.112	0.169	0.068	0.211	
0.009	*2.640	0.111	0.033	0.008	
0.012	**2.522	0.109	0.040	0.100	
0.082	**1.745	0.096	0.062	0.109	
0.000	*3.686	0.199	0.069	0.255	

.(0.05≥α) \*

.(0.05≥α) \*\*

(19)

(1.745) (t) )

: .(0.05≥α) (

:  
(0.05≥α)

) (3.686 2.640 3.112 6.442) (t)

( .(0.05≥α)

( )

( ) (t)

.(0.05≥α) (2.522)

( )

(Stepwise Multiple Regression)  
 (%46.4)  
 (%48)  
 (%48.6)  
 (%49.5) (20)  
 (%39.6)

**(20)**  
**"Stepwise Multiple Regression "**

*t	t	R <sup>2</sup>	
0.000	*10.423	0.396	
0.000	*7.290	0.464	
0.000	*6.914	0.480	
0.000	*3.978	0.486	
0.001	*3.216	0.495	

.(0.05≥α) \*

.( )

(2007 ) .1

.3

(%65.7)  
 (%42.4) ( )  
 ( ) (Sansom, 2001)  
 (%35.4)  
 (%50.5)  
 (%49.2) ( ) (2006 )  
 ( )  
 (%49.9)  
 ( ) (2006 )

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(Kleemannand		(	
	Matuschek, 2002)		
		(2008	)
		(2007	)
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	.2	(Bradly, 2003)	
	.3	(Andreassen, 2007)	
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		(Kleemannand Matuschek, 2002)	
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		(Kleemannand Matuschek, 2002)	
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( <http://www.pogar.org/arabic/governance/arabgov.asp>

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2002 .116-101

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2008 1 1997

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2006 .72-45 14 (9)

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2003 .68-31 )

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"Governance" 2006

2002 ( )

2000 .2006/4/19-17

1993 2005

.95-76

2007 1980

2002

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## **The Availability Characteristics of the Governing Institutional Dimensions, and their Impact on Work Motivation in Commercial Banks Operating in Jordan**

*Ayman S. Al-Qatawneh\**

### **ABSTRACT**

This study aimed to identify the availability of the governing characteristics, and their impact on work motivation in the commercial banks operating in Jordan. To achieve the above objectives, a questionnaire was developed and distributed to sample consists of (304). The study has reached the following conclusions:

1. The respondent perceptions toward the dimensions of the governing characteristics were high. And their perceptions of the dimensions of work motivation, came also high.
2. There was a statistical significant effect for the dimensions of governing institutional on the work motivation in the commercial banks operating in Jordan.

The study recommends the need to adopt departments commercial banks governing concept and the promotion of institutional dimensions, and be convinced of the importance of those departments such rules and controls, which help to implement, and they should enhance dimensions of governing characteristics, through planned efforts in order to create govern organizations.

**Keywords:** Governing Institutional, Work Motivation, Commercial Banks Operating in Jordan.

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