

*

(76)

ANOVA

(t)

:

.1

(ANOVA)

.2

(Dave,2003)

.1

Corporate

Governance

1992

Cadbury Committee

.(Reed, 2002)

(Turmball, 1997)

2007/12/12

.2008/10/13

*

(2003

1999

(Al-Twajjiri et al., 2002) International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Organization for Economic Co-operation
(OECD) and Development

%85

)

(

()

(TOSCO)

2002

(OECD)

.2

(Morgan, 2002)

Securities Exchange (SEC)
Sarbanes and Oxley)

2002 Comission
(Act, 2002

World Enron :

Global Crossing Com

Audit

Committee

Dewing and)

.(Russel, 2000

(2006)

2002 (76)

(46)

(33 32)

2000 (78)

.1

)

			.2
	:		.3
	:	.1	.4
		.2	:
	:	:	.1
		.3	.2
			.3
	:		.4

Null

: Hypothesis

:Ho1 :

Ho1:

:Ho12 :

:Ho13


:Ho14 ()

Stakeholders

Stockholders

:Ho2

:
 :Ho3
 :Ho2₁
)
 :Ho2₂
 :Ho2₃
 :
 :Ho2₄
 :



.3

(Adams,2003)

(Christina, 2005)

"	"			
			Positive Theory	
		(Cornelius		Agency Theory
	(OECD)			and Kought, 2003)
Corporate Social Responsibility	(Hopkins, 2000)			
			(Glasgow, 2003)	
	(Clark, 2004)		Effectiveness	
				Efficiency
				(Williamson,1999)
Radical Innovation				"
Incremental Innovation				
			"	
				(Mathensin, 2002)
			"	
(Corporate				
	:Governance Center, 2002)		"	
Interaction	.1	(2006)	(Reed,2005)
				"
Board Purpose	.2			

Interests of	.2	Board Responsibilities	.3
(...)		Independence	.4
Responsibilities and Role of the Board	.3	Knowledge and Expertise	.5
Quality		Meetings and Information	.6
Integrity and Ethical	.4	Leadership	.7
Behavior		Leader	
		Manager	
		Disclosure	.8
Disclosure and Transparency	.5	Committees	.9
		Internal Audit	.10
Voluntary Disclosure	(Castellano, 2002)		
Mandatory Disclosure		(OECD, 2004) :	(
		Rights and Equitable Treatment	.1
		of Shareholders	

(Prowse, 1997)

(Kim, 2003) Social Responsibility .6

(Dixon , 2001)

.4

:

100

(76)

%88

.(1)

.(Sekaran, 2003: 225) %70

.(2)

)
(

(z)

()

(Kolmogorov-Smirnov)

.(3)

()

.()

.(4)

%99

%22

()

(1)

%				
%26	20	30		.1
%55	42	50		.2
%19	14	20		.3
%100	76	100		

(2)

%87		.1
%92		.2
%88		

(3)

	* Sig.	Kolmogorov-Smirnov (Z)		
	0.126	1.32		.1
	0.071	1.43		.2
	0.093	1.12		.3
	0.136	1.57		.4
	0.082	1.86		.5
	0.115	1.73		.6
	0.064	1.37		.7
	0.082	1.23	()	.8

.05 < (Sig.) *

(4)

20	1	2	5	11	1		.1
42	16	-	2	24	-		.2
14	-	2	3	9	-		.3
76	17	4	10	44	1		.4

(5)

	10	(10-5)	5		
20	10	7	3		.1
42	29	11	2		.2
14	8	5	1		.3
76	47	23	6		.4

%30 (5)

10 %62 (10 -5)

(5,4)

.5

)
(
(7 6)

(3.67)

5 - 4.5
4.5 - 3.67
3.67 - 2.34
2.34 - 1
1 (Means)

(6)

		SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M		
1		0.32	4.88	0.001	5.00	0.35	4.86	0.36	4.86		.1
3		0.68	4.47	0.76	4.43	0.72	4.33	0.44	4.76		.2
4		1.03	2.32	0.075	3.91	0.099	2.17	1.16	2.15		.3
2		0.57	4.68	0.76	4.43	0.43	4.76	0.6	4.67		.4
		0.37	4.15	0.35	4.44	0.35	4.1	0.40	4.11		

2.32 (6)

.1

.4.15

)
4.68 (4.88)
.2 ()

Social Responsibility

()

(6)

.3

(0.57 0.68 0.32)

.(1.03)

()

.(7)

.()

(7)

		SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	
1		0.31	4.90	0.001	5.00	0.30	4.90	0.40	4.81	1
2		0.46	4.77	0.001	5.00	0.37	4.90	0.48	4.33	2
4		0.73	4.31	0.70	4.21	0.74	4.19	0.67	4.62	3
3		0.68	4.48	0.47	4.71	0.53	4.67	0.62	4.05	() 4
		0.33	4.60	0.25	4.73	0.30	4.67	0.35	4.46	

(4.73 4.67)

: (7)

.1

()

(4.60)

()

(4.77 4.90)

(4.48 4.31)

(7)

.3

(6)

.2

(4.46)

(4.60 4.67)

(4.05)

:

(4.67 4.71)

(t)

(ANOVA)

:

Ho1

"

"

Ho1₄ Ho1₃ Ho1₂ Ho1₁

()

.(8)

(8)

	Sig.		t			
	0.001	74	34.25**	0.037	4.15	Ho1
	0.000	74	37.14**	0.32	4.88	Ho1 ₁
	0.013	74	23.36**	0.68	4.47	Ho1 ₂
	0.316	74	1.07**	1.03	2.32	Ho1 ₃
	0.002	74	29.23**	0.57	4.68	Ho1 ₄

.(0.01 ≥ α) **

(3.67) (2.67) : (8)

(2.32) Ho1 .1

(34.25) (t)

(4.15) .(2.62)

3.67

Ho1₄ - Hal

(29.23) (t)

(4.68)

(3.67) Decision Rule .2

Ho1

Ho2

"

Ho1₁ -

Ho2₄ Ho2₃ Ho2₂ Ho2₁ (37.14) (t)

.(9) (4.88)

: (9) (3.67)

(42.23) (t) .1

(4.60) (2.62)

(3.67)

-

Ho1₂

(23.36) (t)

(4.47)

(t) .2 (3.67)

:

Ho2₄ Ho2₃ Ho2₂ Ho2₁

-

Ho1₃

(1.07) (t)

" : Ho3

() "

(10)

ANOVA

(9)

	Sig.		t			
	0.001	74	42.23**	0.33	4.60	Ho2
	0.000	74	44.51**	0.31	4.90	Ho2 ₁
	0.012	74	39.02**	0.46	4.77	Ho2 ₂
	0.017	74	27.16**	0.73	4.31	Ho2 ₃
	0.023	74	36.5**	0.68	4.48	Ho2 ₄

(.001 ≥ α)

**

(10)

(ANOVA)

	Sig.	(F)					
	0.001	7.64*	0.44	2	0.88		
			0.13	74	9.62		
				76	10.51		
	0.08	3.40**	0.72	2	1.44		
			0.09	74	6.97		
				76	8.41		

(.05 ≥ α)

*

(.001 ≥ α)

**

)

: (10)

(

.1

(F)

Ho3

(3.13)

(7.64)

(.05)

(6)

(-)

.Tukey-Kramer

:(301 :2000)

()

()
()

.(11)

ANOVA

(10)

(11)
(0.05) **(Tukey - Kramer)**

		(H)		
()	0.223 *	10.2	0.010	2 1
			0.330*	3 1
			0.340*	3 2

.(0.05 ≥ α)

*

.6

(11)

) (2 1)

(

(3)

.1

.(10)

(ANOVA)

.2

(F)

Ho3

(4.92)

(3.40)

(0.01)

)

(

()

.2

()

.2

.3

(ANOVA)

(Tukey-Kramer)

.3

Ho3

.4

.1

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The Impact of Accounting Systems and Professional Standards in Enhancing Effectiveness and Efficiency of Corporate Governance Systems of Jordanian Public Shareholding Companies

Mohammad A. Matar *

ABSTRACT

The study aimed to investigate the impact of accounting systems and professional standards on enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of corporate governance systems of Jordanian shareholding companies.

The study consisted of two main parts: the first part covered the theoretical framework of (CG), while the second is a field study on a sample of (76) persons who were selected from three groups. Those groups are: non-executive members of the board of directors, external auditors and other bodies who are mainly involved in the development and follow-up of the professional standards such as the central bank, Amman stock exchange and the Jordanian association of certified public accountants.

After analyzing the study data and testing its hypotheses using the two – sample (t) test and the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), the study revealed two main findings:

1. All the accounting systems and professional standards have important impacts on enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of Corporate Governance Systems (CGS), except the social responsibility accounting system which has a moderate impact.
2. The (ANOVA) test revealed that there are significant statistical differences between the viewpoints of the three groups toward the relative importance of accounting systems on enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of (CGS). This was due to their different opinions toward the impact of the social responsibility accounting system and the cost and management system. On the other hand, the same test (ANOVA) revealed that there are no significant statistical differences between the viewpoints of the three groups toward the relative importance of the professional standards on enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of (CGS).

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Accounting Systems, Professional Standards, Effectiveness and Efficiency of Corporate Governance Systems.

* Faculty of Administrative and Financial Sciences, Middle East University for Graduate Studies. Received on 12/12/2007 and Accepted for Publication on 13/10/2008.