

*

36 2004-1980

()

()

:

.1

.(Easterly and Rebelo, 1993)

%2.29

2003

161.4

()

()

2006/5/3

.2006/10/8

*

/

(Spiegel and

Templeman, 2004)

:

-1

(Becsi, 2000)

-2

-3

(Ireland, 1994)

2004-1980

(Mundell and Adams, 1982)

7

7

8 :

14

(Haughwout et al., 2004)

.2

:

(Property Tax)

(Minneapolis)

(Houston)

(Philadelphia)

(New York)

%3.3

%4.9

%2.49

%2.5

.%3.22

%12.5

1974

%2.1

%2.54

:

(Mathews, 2003)

%19.3

%6

(Ravestein and Vijlbriet, 1988)

%70

1985

%19.3

.%67

(Dalamagas, 2003)

(Robert and Edger, 1982)

%57

%33

1979

:

2000-1965

(Robert and Edger, 1983)

:

1979

()

(Stuart, 1981)

.0.62

0.58

%80

%70

:

(Fullerton, 1982)

1973

%78.8

.0.15

(Bahl, Bird and Walker, 2003)

1996-1975

1.1

1991-1959

(Hsing, 1996)

1991

0.3267

Hsing

0.1958

(Aisha, 1995)

$$(\partial^2 T / \partial TR^2) = T(2a_2) + \{a_1 + 2a_2 TR\} (\partial T / \partial TR) \quad (6)$$

.3

$$\partial T / \partial TR = 0$$

$$T(2a_2) > 0 \quad ; \quad \text{Ln } T = a_1 TR + a_2 (TR)^2 + U \quad (1)$$

2004-1980

(1)

OLS

(Augmented Dickey-

Fuller (ADF))

(Intercept and trend)

Akaike Information Criteria (AIC)

.(Theil, 1978)

:(Stationarity)

(Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)) -

6-2

(t,f)

Vector

.Error Correction Model (VECM)

(1)

(1)

t

F

D-W

$$(1/T) (\partial T / \partial TR) = a_1 + 2a_2 TR \quad (2)$$

6-1

.(1)

$$(\partial T / \partial TR) = T \{a_1 + 2a_2 TR\} = 0 \quad (3)$$

$$\text{Ln } T = 71.51 TR - 96.90 (TR)^2 \quad (7)$$

$$a_1 + 2a_2 TR = 0 \quad (4)$$

$$TR = (a_1 / 2a_2) \quad (5)$$

$$(1/T) (\partial T / \partial TR) = 71.51 - 96.90(2) TR \quad (8)$$

$$\frac{\partial T}{\partial TR} = 0 \quad : \quad (\quad)$$

$$(\frac{\partial T}{\partial TR}) = T \{ 71.51 - 96.90(2) TR \} = 0 \quad (9)$$

$$T(-96.90(2)) \quad T > 0 \quad : \quad (\frac{\partial T}{\partial TR}) = 0 \quad T \neq 0$$

$$71.51 - 96.90(2) TR = 0 \quad (10)$$

$$0.35 \quad TR = (71.51 / 96.90(2)) \quad (11)$$

$$0.457 \quad 0.664 \quad TR = 0.369 \quad (12)$$

0.216

0.266

$$(\frac{\partial^2 T}{\partial TR^2}) = T(-96.90(2)) + \{ 71.51 - 96.90(2) TR \} (\frac{\partial T}{\partial TR}) \quad (13)$$

(1)

		D-W	F	TR ²	TR	
0.259	0.369	1.62	148.46	96.90- (5.78-)	71.51 *(6.84)	
0.232	0.383	1.43	61.71	83.98- (3.50-)	64.36 (6.50)	
0.235	0.365	1.93	156.17	96.35- (5.21-)	70.30 (10.41)	
0.237	0.288	1.15	89.16	152.61- (4.18-)	87.77 (6.54)	
0.254	0.457	1.22	125.24	72.87- (6.20-)	66.56 (11.17)	
0.216	0.664	1.10	21.37	29.37- (1.96-)	39.02 (4.56)	
0.255	0.304	1.29	319.36	129.27- (7.29-)	78.68 (12.47)	

.t *

(0.8) D-W

OLS

F t

(2)

t

t

D-W

...

0.3

(5)

0.64

0.4

0.22

0.63

0.212

0.187

(2)

		D-W	F	TR ²	TR	
0.311	0.396	1.80	311.1	95.77- (7.70-)	75.90 *(14.55)	
0.371	0.495	0.80	727.42	64.10- (9.55-)	63.41 (20.13)	
0.314	0.368	1.10	816.95	108.87- (9.44-)	80.03 (17.22)	
0.187	0.330	1.18	352.82	146.86- (8.67-)	97.02 (18.24)	
0.368	0.645	1.28	62.56	41.32- (4.28-)	53.33 (7.91)	-
0.405	0.634	1.20	333.54	43.66- (10.62-)	55.39 (18.27)	
0.212	0.227	1.38	1559.88	345.31- (14.38-)	156.91 (25.81)	

.t

*

13

(3)

(4)

OLS

1

F t

F t

D-W

.(0.9)

8

D-W

0.337 0.296

6

0.2

.(5)

0.293
(0.19)

0.204

.0.437

(3)

		D-W	F	TR ²	TR	
0.298	0.30	1.93	277.34	169.19- (6.69-)	101.50 **(10.82)	
0.213	0.322	1.45	148.19	133.37- (6.15-)	85.99 (10.32)	
0.219	0.296	0.90	49.17	123.91- (4.00-)	73.30 (6.19)	
0.173	0.297	1.59	103.17	160.97- (6.14-)	95.54 (9.96)	
0.07	0.05	0.65	6.37	431.1 (2.33)	39.84 (1.49)	*
0.296	0.304	1.94	2125.11	164.36- (22.18-)	99.77 (35.90)	
0.292	0.337	1.24	486.88	115.86- (10.34-)	78.16 (17.73)	

*

.t

**

0.249

0.244

0.212

0.442

(0.393)

0.310

(0.310)

0.28

()

%60

(4)

		D-W	F	TR ²	TR	
0.191	0.241	1.51	210.71	227.45- (7.33-)	109.59 *(11.74)	
0.344	0.437	1.95	536.35	85.672- (10.22-)	74.908 (18.83)	
*	*	094	21.15	26.457 (4.54)	19.105 (5.02)	
0.221	0.194	0.98	67.93	451.05 (5.24-)	175.44 (7.71)	
0.246	0.334	1.44	215.99	125.80- (6.98-)	84.013 (12.55)	/
0.170	0.191	0.36	82.62	362.25- (4.08-)	138.28 (6.92)	
0.295	0.398	0.79	279.32	93.65- (7.98-)	74.628 (15.04)	
0.178	0.293	0.99	201.99	167.48- (6.64-)	98.024 (12.01)	
*	*	1.49	30.92	22.10- **(1.69-)	41.052 (4.54)	
0.211	0.280	0.87	401.53	162.44- (9.23-)	91.045 (16.34)	
0.228	0.289	1.1	128.12	199.67- (4.91-)	115.54 (8.04)	
0.205	0.277	1.25	82.20	177.25- (3.90-)	98.30 (7.15)	

.t *

0.149
 (0.393 0.244)
 0.310) 0.132
 0.07 (0.442
 .)
 : ()
 -1
 .)
 -2
 .)
 -3
 -2

-4

-3

()

- Ireland, P. 1994. Supply-Side Economics and Endogenous Growth, *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 33(3): 559-571.
- Matthews, Kent. 2003. VAT Evasion and VAT Avoidance: is there a European Laffer Curve for Vat? *International Review of Applied Economics*, 17(1):105-114.
- Mundell, Lee and Adams, Jack. 1982. The Laffer Curve, Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply, *Journal of Economics and Business*, 21(1): 13-25.
- Ravestein, Van and Vijilbrief, H. 1988. Welfare Cost of Higher Tax Rates: An Empirical Laffer Curve for the Netherlands, *De Economist*, 136, 205-219.
- Robert, McGee and Edgar, Feige. 1983. Sweden Laffer Curve: Taxation and the Unobserved Economy, *Scand Journal of Economics*, 85(4): 499-519.
- Robert, McGee and Edgar, Feige. 1982. The Unobserved Economy and the UK Laffer Curve, *Economic Affairs*, 3(1): 36-43.
- Spiegel, Uriel and Templeman, Joseph. 2004. A Non-Singular Peaked Laffer Curve: Debunking the Traditional Laffer Curve, *The American Economist*, 48(2): 61-66.
- Stuart, C. 1981. Swedish Tax Rate, Labor Supply and Tax Revenues, *Journal of Political Economy*, 89(5): 1020-1038.
- Theil, Henri. 1978. *Introduction to Econometrics*, Prentice-Hall, N.J., 74-78.
- Aisha, Ghaus, A. 1995. Optimal Local Sales Tax, *Urban Studies*, 32(8):1369-1381.
- Bahl, Roy; Bird, Richard and Walker, Mary. 2003. The Uneasy Case Against Discriminatory Excise Taxation: Soft Drink Taxes in Ireland, *Public Finance Review*, 31(5): 510-533.
- Becsi, zsolt. 2000. The Shifty Laffer, *Curve Economic Review: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta*, 85, (3): 53-63.
- Dalamagas, Basil. 2003. The Effects of Tax Rate Changes on Output and Government Deficits, *Applied Economics Letters*, 10(2): 97-101.
- Easterly, William and Rebelo, Sergio. 1993. Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth: An Empirical Investigation, *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 32, 417-458.
- Fullerton, D. 1982. On the Possibility of Inverse Relationship Between Tax Rates and Government Revenues, *Journal of Public Economics*, 19, 3-22.
- Haughwout, Andrew; Inman, Robert; Craig, Steven and Luce, Thomas. 2004. Local Revenue Hills: Evidence from Four U.S Cities, *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 86(2): 570-585.
- Hsing, Yu. 1996. Estimating the Laffer Curve and Policy Implication, *Journal of Socio-Economics*, 25(3): 395-402.

Estimating Laffer Curve for Profit Tax in Selected Jordanian Companies

*Sai'd M. Al-Tarawnih**

ABSTRACT

This study aims to analyze the relationship between tax rate and tax receipts, it also aims to determine the optimal tax rate through estimating laffer curve. For that, the study used data for 36 Jordanian companies for 1980-2004 period. On contrast to previous literature that estimate laffer curve on macro level, this study estimates laffer curve on micro level.

The optimal tax rate obtained after estimating laffer curve through two steps: in the first, we assure data stationarity by using unit root test. In the second step, OLS was employed. The result revealed that the actual tax rate is less than the optimal tax rate. This means that the government could raise profit tax rate, especially for bank and insurance companies, to increase tax receipts. The results also showed that the actual tax rate is approximately equal among service and productive sectors (industry). This may require restructured tax rates among sectors towards encouraging productive sector, since Jordan economy characterized by service sector dominances.

Keywords: Laffer Curve, Optimal Tax Rate, Tax Policy, Actual Tax Rate.

* Department of Business and Finance Economics, Faculty of Business Administration, Mu'tah University, Al-Karak, Jordan. Received on 3/5/2006 and Accepted for Publication on 8/10/2006.